Fighting malnutrition in Madagascar: from NGO to social enterprise by Chéret, Emmanuel & Desjonquères, Antoine
 
Field Actions Science Reports
The journal of field actions 
Vol. 7 | 2014
Vol. 7
Fighting malnutrition in Madagascar: from NGO to
social enterprise
Lutter contre la malnutrition à Madagascar : de l’ONG à l’entreprise sociale
Combatir la malnutrición en Madagascar: de la ONG a la empresa social








Emmanuel Chéret and Antoine Desjonquères, « Fighting malnutrition in Madagascar: from NGO to
social enterprise », Field Actions Science Reports [Online], Vol. 7 | 2014, Online since 02 December 2014,
connection on 19 April 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/factsreports/3738 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License
Fighting malnutrition in Madagascar:  
from NGO to social enterprise
Emmanuel Chéret1 and Antoine Desjonquères2 
1 Student at HEC Paris, majoring in Entrepreneurship, emmanuel.cheret@hec.edu 
2 Student at HEC Paris, majoring in Alternative Management, antoine.dsjqr@gmail.com
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Abstract. In Madagascar, more than 50% of children under 5 years of age suffer from chronic malnutrition. 
The physical and cognitive consequences are irreversible after 24 months. GRET’s Nutrimad program ad-
dresses this problem by distributing an enriched lour product—“Koba Aina”—for children between 6 and 24 
months. In order to reach the poorest households, it is sold very cheaply via an innovative sales network, the 
Hotelin-Jazakely (restaurants for babies), set up in the most deprived districts. In parallel, nutritional educa-
tion campaigns are aimed at the mothers, who are often misinformed about the nutritional needs of their 
children. The level of maturity attained by the program is such that GRET now plans to continue with it over 
the long term. A privately-owned company, Nutri’zaza, is due to be created shortly to pursue Nutrimad’s ac-
tivities, helping the project to achieve the economic viability that it currently lacks. By embedding Nutri’zaza’s 
work in a social enterprise, GRET hopes to secure the future of the initiative and enable it to expand through-
out the country.
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1. Causes and consequences of child 
malnutrition in Madagascar
1.1 Chronic malnutrition: the igures
In Madagascar, 50.1% of children under 5 suffer 
from stunted growth (according to the demographic 
and health survey DHS IV, 2008-2009), also known 
as chronic malnutrition. This emerges as the underly-
ing cause of 35% of infant and child mortality (The 
Lancet, 2008). In addition to the impact on children’s 
development, which is heavily determined by the 
irst 2 years of life, and on their resistance to disease, 
chronic malnutrition leads to irreversible cognitive 
damage after the age of two. The window of opportu-
nity to combat this phenomenon is therefore limited 
essentially to the 24 months following conception.
While chronic malnutrition is a multi-factorial 
problem, the main factor appears to be the poor feed-
ing practices adopted by most Malagasy mothers. 
Although breast-feeding is common practice, moth-
ers tend to diversify their children’s food too quickly, 
before the children are 6 months old. Children are fed 
mainly on rice-based dishes, or with other foods 
whose low nutritional value—combined with the fre-
quency of meals—cannot meet their needs. This is 
due primarily to the mothers’ low level of knowledge 
about the speciic needs of young children. The 
symptoms of malnutrition are mostly invisible to the 
untrained eye, offering mothers little by the way of 
early warning signals about the state of their chil-
dren’s health. Moreover, the high-quality food sup-
plements for babies that are available on the local 
market  (Blédina, Nestlé, Farilac, etc.) are expensive, 
Table 1. Prices of products available in Madagascar for children of 6 months and over
Products Blédina Cérélac Farilac Koba Aina
Price of a 35g serving AR 1265 AR 1136 AR 700 AR 150
% of daily budget for 2 meals a day, based on minimum 
salary
76% 68% 42% 9%
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beyond the reach of most households. On top of which the 
people of Madagascar have a strong traditional attachment to 
rice, which is their main staple food, and children are ex-
pected to adapt to it at a very young age. 
1.2 A major barrier to development
Child malnutrition is a powerful barrier to development. The 
irreversible damage it causes to cognitive development seri-
ously hampers the professional potential of the individuals 
concerned. As a study published by The Lancet in 2008 
shows, children affected by malnutrition are more likely, as 
adults, to attain lower educational levels, to achieve lower 
occupational status and to earn lower incomes. Poor health 
and greater exposure to poverty are transmitted from one 
generation to the next, giving the problem a cyclic character. 
According to the World Bank, on a global scale, the impair-
ments caused by malnutrition represent a loss of 2 to 3% of 
GDP. 
1.3 The powerlessness of governments to deal with 
the problem
For these reasons, the returns generated by investments aimed 
at combatting malnutrition are among the highest, according 
to the ranking established by the Copenhagen Consensus. 
And yet national funding for the ight against malnutrition 
remains low. This is partly due to the multiplicity of good 
causes competing for scarce inancial and human resources. 
The cost of such programs remains out of reach of the gov-
ernment of Madagascar, where the annual cost of a program 
to prevent chronic malnutrition by distributing free daily food 
supplements for children between 6 and 24 months can be 
estimated at 96 million euros: equal to 110% of projected op-
erating and investment spending on health and family plan-
ning in the government’s 2010 budget. 
1.4 Private initiatives 
The importance of this barrier to development has led some 
actors in the private sphere to come up with new solutions to 
combat child malnutrition in Madagascar over the long term. 
JB, for example, drawing on its experience in the agrifood 
industry, joined the PlumpyField network in 2009. Under the 
brand name Tanjaka, created for the occasion, JB now pro-
duces and markets foods similar to Plumpy, initially devel-
oped by the Nutriset group.
In so doing, JB seeks to leverage its industrial and com-
mercial skills, and its established logistics network, to offer 
high nutritional value-added products to the very poor at af-
fordable prices.
About ten years earlier, GRET—a French NGO active in 
Madagascar since1988—and the IRD (Institut de Recherche 
pour le Développement) were grappling with the question of 
how best to compensate for the shortfalls in the diet of 
Malagasy children. After developing an enriched lour prod-
uct for children, designed as a food supplement for children 
aged 6 to 24 months, GRET, its institutional partners in 
Madagascar, and the IRD built up an innovative network to 
communicate about the nutritional needs of young children 
and to sell the product at a price adjusted to the low incomes 
of Malagasy households.
This paper sets out to illustrate in which ways the social 
enterprise model can be seen as complementary to govern-
ment-led anti-malnutrition programs.
2. Koba Aina and its distribution in the Hotelin-
Jazakely network: the Nutrimad program 
2.1 The design of a suitable and affordable product: 
Koba Aina
The program set up by Nutrimad—the Madagascar branch of 
Nutridev, which encompasses GRET’s and the IRD’s nutri-
tional programs—began with a study conducted in rural and 
urban areas between 1997 and 2000, which highlighted the 
diversity of the causes of child malnutrition in Madagascar. 
Poor nutritional awareness among mothers, lack of time and 
appropriate utensils in households, unavailability of products 
on the market: these causes are both socio-anthropological 
and economic. GRET developed the conviction that these is-
sues had to be addressed in a holistic way. Nutrimad set itself 
apart from existing programs through the dual dimension of 
its action: the nutritional education dispensed by its programs 
was backed up by the marketing of a product suitable for 
young children, and at a price the great majority of the popu-
lation could afford. Koba Aina (literally “lour of life”), a 
lour product formulated speciically for children of 6 to 24 
months, was developed as part of a collaboration between the 
IRD and the University of Antananarivo. Designed as a re-
sponse to several of the underlying causes of malnutrition, it 
combines several essential qualities. Firstly, it offers nutri-
tional qualities indispensable to healthy child development, 
thanks to its vital supplements; it consequently complies with 
all the applicable standards. Secondly, as 99% of it consists of 
local agricultural products such as maize, rice, soya and 
groundnuts, it suits local tastes. Finally, it can be prepared 
quickly, easily and safely: the lour is mixed with cold water, 
and the mixture is brought to the boil for 5 minutes, to pre-
vent the risks linked to contaminated water. Daily consump-
tion of two 35g rations between 6 and 12 months, and of three 
daily rations between 12 and 24 months, covers 39 and 56% 
of energy needs respectively and about 50% of recommended 
daily intakes, the rest being provided by breast-feeding. 
Produced by TAF, a major local agrifood company, Koba 
Aina is distributed through an innovative sales network: the 
Hotelin-Jazakely (restaurants for babies), the irst of which 
opened in 2000.
2.2 How the distribution network operates
The Hotelin-Jazakely are located in the more populous dis-
tricts of Madagascar’s cities. Each one theoretically covers 
an area inhabited by 400 “target” children (6 to 24 months). 
In the Hotelin-Jazakely, customers eat pre-prepared meals on 
the premises, or buy sachets to eat later. Whichever format 
they choose, one helping represents 35g of lour and sells for 
150 ariary (€0.05).
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Each Hotelin-Jazakely is entirely managed by one or two 
women, known as “animatrices”, who perform all the tasks at 
the Hotelin-Jazakely: upkeep, preparing the Koba Aina, and 
handling sales. They also perform “mobile rounds”, selling 
prepared rations or sachets at the customer’s home. In keep-
ing with the product’s positioning as a complete meal, the 
mobile rounds have to be performed at mealtimes. The ani-
matrices are given complete autonomy in the organization of 
their rounds: these must be suficiently regular to retain cus-
tomers, while maintaining the ability to reach out to new “tar-
gets”. The animatrices are recruited from the districts where 
they work, giving them crucial legitimacy among local moth-
ers. As well as selling the product, they perform an educa-
tional role: they have to convince mothers that it is in their 
children’s interest to eat Koba Aina rather than the family 
meal. Their effectiveness is ensured by the remuneration sys-
tem: they are not employed by GRET; instead they receive a 
commission of 25 ariary (16%) per ration sold.
They pick up their supplies from the program ofice every 
week: 1-kilo bags, which can be used to make 25 to 28 ra-
tions, and 35-gram sachets, which they sell directly.
Figure 1. An animatrice in front of her Hotelin-Jazakely
Figure 2. An animatrice on her mobile round
The animatrices have to pass on the proceeds of their sales 
regularly, via the “Orange Money” telephone-based system, 
to cut down on cash transfers. Every day, they go to an Orange 
Money terminal and deposit the amount of their sales, which 
is transferred directly to Nutrimad’s account. Their proit 
margin is paid out weekly or monthly, as they prefer.
Given the substantial autonomy granted to the animatrices, 
quality control is of key importance. Spot checks are used to 
prevent over-dilution of the lour, in case an animatrice is 
tempted to increase her income to the detriment of the nutri-
tional value of the rations sold.
The animatrices are also supervised by coaches (roughly 1 
coach per 8 animatrices), who act as their primary points of 
contact: the coaches accompany them regularly to help them 
cope with the dificulties of selling. To stimulate sales, the 
coaches and animatrices are given volume targets (2700 ra-
tions a month). The animatrices are also free to sell sachets to 
local grocery stores, which then sell them on. Some of the 
women work on stands rather than at the Hotelin-Jazakely, 
while others only do mobile rounds, selling 35g sachets.
2.3 Nutritional education actions
As well as selling Koba Aina, the animatrices are entrusted 
with a nutritional education mission. The personal relation-
ship built up by the animatrice with the mothers in her dis-
trict, whether on her rounds or at the Hotelin-Jazakely, makes 
her the go-to person for these mothers on questions of child 
nutrition.  She dispenses advice on the right practices to fol-
low, depending on the age of the child, and proposes Koba 
Aina as a suitable food supplement. Weekly weighing ses-
sions are also organized at the Hotelin-Jazakely. The nutri-
tional education lealets handed out at these sessions enable 
the mothers to monitor their child’s weight and compare it 
with the “normal” development for their age. Finally, “ani-
mations Koba Aina” are organized around these regular 
events, where mothers can come and try the product, learn 
how to prepare it, and receive nutritional advice. 
Figure 3. A weighing session
2.4 Changing management models: the problem of 
oversight
The Nutrimad service has been through several successive 
modes of management, corresponding to different attempts 
by GRET to make the program autonomous. Up until 2006, 
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GRET took full management responsibility, in order to bring 
the program to a certain level of maturity. At that point, the 
organization wanted to hand over the management of the ser-
vice to the animatrices, its key human resource, in order to 
develop something akin to the cooperative model. However, 
the animatrice groups or “associations” set up by GRET for 
that purpose in each city proved to be ill-suited to managing 
the service. The model did not correspond to any desire on 
the part of the animatrices. When faced with governance 
problems, they continued to rely on GRET, which was only 
supposed to offer general guidelines. This failure gave rise to 
the creation of a second association in 2008, bringing togeth-
er the Nutrimad program’s supervisory staff, mainly the 
coaches. This model also failed: although sales remained 
level, problems emerged with management, culminating in 
the embezzlement of the program’s funds. The associative 
model having proved ineffective on two occasions, mainly 
due to the dificulty of inding eficient, responsible manag-
ers, GRET opted for a new mode of management in 2010: the 
social enterprise model. The service was, from then on, man-
aged by GRET staff along standard business lines. The proj-
ect was baptized Nutri’zaza, and is scheduled to become a 
privately-held company in 2012.
3. Dificulties encountered
3.1 Inertia of consumption habits 
Despite the multiple beneits of the service offered by 
Nutrimad, the level of consumption of the product per child 
often remains relatively low. In fact, few children eat more 
than one ration a day. The irst obstacle to achieving the con-
sumption frequency recommended by Nutrimad is the price: 
initially 60 ariary (€0.02), it rose to 100 ariary (€0.04) in 
2007 and to 150 ariary (€0.05) in 2009. These successive 
price hikes were a response to inlation and to questions of 
product positioning. While the price of a ration remains some 
5 times lower than that of imported products of the same 
type—and for higher nutritional value—it still represents a 
signiicant outlay for poor Malagasy households, of which 
68% survive on less than $1.25 a day (UNICEF, 2009). And 
despite the nutritional education effort, many mothers con-
tinue to see the shared family meal as an alternative to buying 
speciic foodstuffs for their children.  Consequently, due to 
inertia in eating habits, Koba Aina is often limited to ad-hoc 
consumption, notably as an afternoon snack. Mothers also 
prefer to vary their children’s food after a certain age. More 
rarely, mothers will take umbrage at being given advice on 
how to feed their children. Finally, although the image of 
Koba Aina is gaining ground in the neighborhoods, some 
mothers associate eating at the Hotelin-Jazakely or during the 
animatrices’ rounds with a service “for poor people”. Some 
prefer to pay more for the product at a grocery store rather 
than go through these distribution channels.
3.2 The importance of marketing
One thing is immediately evident: designing a product and a 
mode of distribution tailored to the context is not in 
itself suficient to adequately penetrate a market governed by 
deeply anchored habits: the marketing dimension is essential. 
Sales leveled out in 2007, and GRET was faced with the lim-
its of its experience in the commercial ield.
For this reason, in 2007 and 2008, GRET and Blédina en-
tered a partnership to pool their human resources and respec-
tive expertise in order to improve the economic performance 
of Koba Aina sales.
Blédina’s expertise, as Danone’s child nutrition subsidiary, 
helped to consolidate the marketing approach to the project. 
The aim was to create a brand image for Koba Aina. Several 
approaches were adopted, such as deining a clear positive 
positioning for the product or improving the packaging and 
design. The new Koba Aina logo, for example, was displayed 
on working uniforms and tools, to reinforce brand recogni-
tion. The partnership had to be brought to an end, for reasons 
beyond the control of either party, but there was a strong 
positive impact for Nutrimad: sales rose signiicantly in the 
following years. And Blédina was able to mobilize resources 
around a motivational project, thus developing its expertise 
in “bottom of the pyramid” markets. The partnership with 
GRET led the brand to change the way it communicated 
about its products in Madagascar. The product descriptions 
are now more transparent, and help reinforce mothers’ knowl-
edge about their children’s nutritional needs.
3.3 Human resources management
Managing the program’s human resources also brought its 
share of dificulties. For reasons of cost-effectiveness, the 
animatrices—the program’s sales force and ambassadors 
in the districts—are not paid a salary by GRET, but are 
paid on a commission basis. They consequently beneit 
from substantial autonomy in their work, but encounter 
signiicant dificulties, principally of an economic order. 
The problem is that a large commission percentage would 
impact the price of the product and thereby its effective-
ness as a tool in the ight against malnutrition. The current 
commission level is 25 ariary (approx. €0.01) per ration 
sold. In view of the dificulty of making sales, this level 
may seem low: some of the animatrices ind it hard to 
meet the set targets and barely scrape a living. Then there 
is the question of recruitment: how to ind women that 
have the ability to sell suficient volumes of product? 
Despite deining a standard proile to help target poten-
tially gifted saleswomen, turnover remains very high 
(107% in 2011). Many new animatrices, confronted with 
the dificulties of selling, give up after just a few weeks. 
There is therefore a basic need for effective training, to 
enable women to quickly achieve the set sales targets. The 
training provided was initially very theoretical, but it is 
now done on-the-job via a pairing system, which seems to 
be well received by the animatrices. Granting autonomy to 
the animatrices also involves leaving them to sort out the 
sometimes thorny issue of the delimitation of sales territo-
ries. This would appear to be the best solution, but there 
are still many conlicts over the allocation of certain 
customers.
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Managing the proceeds is also a delicate issue. Despite 
using Orange Money, which is designed to facilitate and 
increase the frequency of money transfers, many problems 
persist with the recovery of the money by the program’s 
management. There are unfortunate cases of animatrices 
being robbed as they walk down the street with the day’s 
takings. Additionally, animatrices admit to being tempted 
to borrow the money when times are hard. When this does 
happen, it leads to disputes with the management. Finally, 
the animatrices express a degree of discontent with a sys-
tem they see as too rigid: some complain of being forced 
to adhere to the opening hours of the Orange Money termi-
nals, and wasting time standing in line there every day. 
However, while this system does entail a cost (0.9% of 
transactions) and a number of drawbacks, it allows for a 
signiicant reduction in cases of animatrices losing the 
proceeds, which used to be a frequent occurrence.
4. Costs and results of the program
4.1 Still deep in the red
Today selling Koba Aina—Nutrimad’s core business—is still 
a loss-making activity. The (negative) difference between the 
revenues and the costs is recorded in GRET’s accounts as an 
expense. The activity is therefore heavily dependent on fund-
ing from GRET. The program’s inancial autonomy is cur-
rently non-existent: the deicit is approximately AR200m a 
year (€74,000).
With 1,936,414 rations sold in the course of the year, sales 
turnover for 2011 was AR242m (€89,000).
The ixed costs are mainly committed costs (central costs 
and depreciation) and marketing expenses. These amount to 
96% of the sales revenue. 
To achieve equilibrium, the volume of sales would need to 
be signiicantly increased. The break-even point in terms of 
sales revenue is 1,600 million ariary, meaning that the pro-
gram would need to sell 12,820,000 rations merely to cover 
its ixed costs and break even.
The variable costs include: the cost of buying the inished 
product from TAF, the transportation costs, the cost of the 
coal used in preparing the rations, and commission payments 
to the animatrices. These amount to 85% of the sales 
revenue.





Purchase from supplier (TAF), 67%
Finally, it should be noted that the expenditure recorded as 
marketing costs is mainly for nutritional education. For ex-
ample, 30% of this expenditure is used to inance the weekly 
weighing sessions.
4.2 Impact of Koba Aina sales in the target districts 
Koba Aina has gradually made a name for itself as a bench-
mark product. In Tananarive, the 16 Hotelin-Jazakely and 9 
stands give the product high visibility in some of the city’s 
poorest neighborhoods. According to a study conducted in 
2011 (involving 8 districts and 1,400 households), Koba Aina 
has a recognition rate of 100% among households with chil-
dren of 6 to 24 months in the target districts. This recognition 
is due in large part to the work of the animatrices, who have 
become the go-to people for mothers when it comes to the 
nutrition of young children. The nutritional education ac-
tions, meanwhile, are effective in raising mothers’ awareness 
of the importance of child nutrition during the irst 2 years. 
As well as reinforcing their knowledge, they provide visibil-
ity for the product, which is now seen as the best alternative 
to the shared family meal.
As a result, the product’s penetration rate among children 
between 6 and 24 months has grown constantly and is cur-
rently at 62%. Regular consumption is still limited, however: 
according to the 2011 study, only 7.7% of the children who 
have already eaten the product have a consumption level of at 
least one ration a day.
The impact of the product in the districts is not limited to 
children between 6 and 24 months. Indeed, its nutritional 
qualities are beneicial to people of all ages. It is currently 
estimated that “non-target” sales, i.e. for people over 24 
months, account for between 30 and 50% of total sales of the 
product. According to some fokontany leaders (fokontany are 
Madagascar’s smallest administrative units), Koba Aina en-
ables some adults who could only take one or two meals a 
day to have an inexpensive midday meal without losing time.
5. Nutri’zaza: a social enterprise to pursue  
Nutrimad’s activities 
5.1 A limited company incorporated in Madagascar
The level of maturity attained by the program is such that 
GRET now plans to continue with it over the long term. To 
secure the future of Koba Aina sales, the NGO is behind a 
project to create a privately-owned limited company based in 
Madagascar, Nutri’zaza, whose corporate mission will be to 
combat child malnutrition by continuing Nutrimad’s activity. 
The primary objective of the company, which will be set up 
in September 2012, is to make the Nutrimad program inde-
pendent from the donations that currently keep it aloat. By 
investing large sums in the program, the shareholders are set-
ting themselves the goal of achieving inancial equilibrium 
within 5 years. After that time, the break-even subsidy grant-
ed by the AFD, which will support the company from its cre-
ation, will come to an end. The management of the program 
will therefore become independent from GRET. However, 
the NGO will remain closely involved in the decision pro-
cess: it will be the company’s main shareholder with a 34% 
holding, and will provide the chair for the board of directors. 
This will give it signiicant inluence in the deinition of the 
company’s strategic and social orientations and mode of gov-
ernance. GRET intends to use that inluence to make sure that 
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effective resources are in place to maintain the program’s so-
cial vocation. Once that continuation has been secured, and 
inancial stability achieved, GRET plans to withdraw from 
the company’s capital. 
Besides GRET, the shareholders are: SIDI (Solidarité in-
ternationale pour le développement et l’investissement) for 
22%; I&P (Investisseur et partenaire pour le développement) 
for 22%; TAF for 20% and APEM (Association pour la pro-
motion de l’entreprise à Madagascar) for 2%. The 5 share-
holders are agreed on the social purpose of the company: 
Nutri’zaza’s goal will not be to make proits, but rather to 
ight child malnutrition. The chosen model is that of the so-
cial enterprise. Consequently, the shareholders agree not to 
receive dividends beyond the amounts initially invested. All 
proits will be directly reinvested into the company, to expand 
and improve the Hotelin-Jazakely network. Nutri’zaza will 
be managed and supervised by the GRET staff currently 
working on the Nutrimad project. They will resign from their 
jobs in order to become employees of Nutri’zaza. The super-
visory structure of the activities will therefore remain practi-
cally unchanged, and continuity will be assured.
5.2 The expansion of the program and the quest for 
proitability
Nutri’Zaza has set itself the target of achieving inancial au-
tonomy within 4 years. Several levers will be mobilized: ex-
panding the Hotelin-Jazakely network, improving sales of 
Koba Aina to NGOs and, inally, developing the sale of Koba 
Aina in conventional retail networks.
The business plan provides for the opening of additional 60 
Hotelin-Jazakelys by 2015, at a pace of 20 openings a year 
over 3 years.
Nutri’Zaza will also invest signiicant efforts in developing 
the NGO sales circuit: Koba Aina is sold in the form of 1kg 
bags to NGOs that distribute free food to destitute popula-
tions. This circuit is not yet suficiently developed; it repre-
sented only 15% of total sales in 2012. It is of particular inter-
est, however, in that it combines social impact with 
proitability. By offering a quality product at a low 
price, Nutri’Zaza provides a useful solution for NGOs ight-
ing malnutrition. The product can then get through to chil-
dren in the most deprived categories of the population, who 
are out of reach of the Hotelin-Jazakely network. This mar-
ket, accessible at lower cost, represents a large potential 
volume.
Finally, a new sachet format will be marketed via the con-
ventional retail networks, aimed at more afluent categories 
of the population. Its 50g weight and better-quality packag-
ing are aimed at groups with greater spending power. This 
investment, with its lower social impact, will therefore have 
proitability as its primary goal.
5.3 Securing the project’s social vocation
The creation of the company relects the desire to boost the 
project’s social impact. However, bringing in private capital 
generates immediate tension between the proitability neces-
sary to the irm’s survival and its ability to expand and fulill 
its social purpose. 
Firstly there is the question of the established net proit 
margin. Affordability, after all, is the cornerstone of the prod-
uct’s social utility, and so dificult trade-off decisions have to 
be made. Larger margins mean greater proitability. The eco-
nomic asset could consequently grow, and the program’s 
scope could be expanded along with the network. However, 
larger margins will inevitably impact the price of the product 
and/or the remuneration of the animatrices. Conversely, low-
er margins condemn the company to stagnation. During the 
initial years, devoted to the quest for inancial equilibrium, 
the plan is to peg the price of the product to that of the raw 
materials from which it is made.
That invites another question: under what conditions is the 
company to become proitable? A large increase in sales vol-
umes is not synonymous with social impact. The product has 
to reach the target populations, i.e. households in Madagascar’s 
most modest neighborhoods, and particularly children be-
tween 6 and 24 months. Once again, there is a delicate bal-
ance to be struck. Consumption of Koba Aina is beneicial at 
any age, and its sale to more afluent populations is a key 
factor in the project’s economic viability.  However, the goals 
of reaching break-even point and of expanding the network 
must not be achieved by sacriicing the affordability of Koba 
Aina for the greater number. Resource allocation is therefore 
a key problem: for Nutri’zaza, it is about deining just how 
much time and money it intends to invest in the primary pur-
suit of its target.
All of these questions around the creation of a private com-
pany have generated a degree of wariness among some of the 
existing stakeholders, for whom enterprise equates to proits 
and private interests. The absence of dividends is not sufi-
cient to guard against the potential problems involved in 
privatizing the program. Achieving proitability means in-
vesting in sales circuits whose social impact will be less sig-
niicant than that of the Hotelin-Jazakely network. The new 
product positioning to be created for that purpose risks being 
assimilated to a quest for “shareholder value”, and Nutri’zaza 
needs to ensure the support of its partners, especially the local 
authorities, who grant concessions of land or premises for the 
Hotelin-Jazakely.
For all of these reasons, the question of the company’s 
mode of governance is crucial. Nutri’zaza needs to be able to 
evaluate its social impact, in terms of inputs as well as out-
comes, and to produce regular reports. The company will 
therefore set up an ethics and surveillance committee, made 
up of GRET’s former institutional and technical partners in 
Madagascar on the Nutrimad program. The committee will 
play a consultative role, and will publish an annual report on 
the company. To this end, Nutri’zaza will draft a white paper 
listing the social indicators that it plans to use every year for 
its evaluation. Four axes have been deined. The irst will be 
to describe in detail the proposed service: product price 
breakdown and the expansion of the Hotelin-Jazakely net-
work. The second will list the resources implemented (i.e. 
nutritional education actions) to target children of 6 to 24 
months. The third will quantify the nutritional impacts: the 
number of people reached by the product and the consumer 
proiles. The inal set of indicators will focus on the 
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animatrices: working conditions and earnings relative to 
market incomes. With these indicators to guide it, the ethics 
and surveillance committee will be the long-term guarantor 
of Nutri’zaza’s continuing social mission.
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